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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates whether it is fruitful to describe the role culture began to play at some 
point in the hominin lineage as pointing to a transition in individuality, by reference to the 
works of Buss, Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry, Michod and Godfrey-Smith. The chief ques-
tion addressed is whether a population of groups having different cultural phenotypes is either 
paradigmatically Darwinian or marginal, by using Godfrey-Smith’s representation of such 
transitions in a multi-dimensional space. Richerson and Boyd’s «dual inheritance» theory, 
and the explanation it provides of the evolution of cooperation in the hominin lineage, is taken 
into account to shed light on the way Godfrey-Smith deals with cultural evolution, especially 
concerning the amount of variation in a population of groups with various cultural phenotypes, 
the role played by multi-level selection in the evolutionary dynamics of such a population and 
the adequacy of different modalities of group-reproduction. 
KEYWORDS
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RESUMEN
Este trabajo indaga acerca de si es fructífero o no describir el papel que la cultura comenzó a 
jugar en algún punto en el linaje de los homininos como si se tratara de una transición en la 
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individualidad, en referencia a las obras de Buss, Maynard-Smith y Szathmáry, y Michod y 
Godfrey-Smith. La cuestión principal es si una población de grupos con diferentes fenotipos 
culturales es o bien paradigmáticamente darwiniana o bien marginal, usando para ello la re-
presentación de Godfrey-Smith de tales transiciones en un espacio multidimensional. La teoría 
de la «herencia dual» de Richerson y Boyd, y la explicación que proporciona de la cooperación 
en el linaje hominino es tenida en cuenta para arrojar luz sobre el modo en que Godfrey-Smith 
trata la evolución cultural, especialmente en lo concerniente a la cantidad de variación en una 
población de grupos con diversos fenotipos culturales, el papel jugado por la selección multi-
nivel en el dinámica evolutiva de tal población y la adecuación de diferentes modalidades de 
reproducción de grupos.
PALABRAS CLAVE
TRANSICIONES EN LA INDIVIDUALIDAD, EVOLUCIÓN CULTURAL, POBLACIO-
NES DARWINIANAS, EVOLUCIÓN DE LA COOPERACIÓN, TEORÍA DE LA HEREN-
CIA DUAL
A biologicAl terminology hAs often been employed to describe human 
groups, as in the use of the concept of organism, or that of superorganism, to 
depict the functional organization of human societies. I want in this paper to 
appraise another approach: to look at early hominin groups as being the pos-
sible outcome of a transition in individuality (TI), by taking other well-known 
transitions as models.1
In his groundbreaking book The evolution of individuality (1987), Buss 
tackles fundamentally the problem of the evolution of hierarchical organization, 
especially	that	one	we	find	in	multicellular	organisms.	In	Buss’	view,	the	chief	
properties of those kinds of individuals are:
(i) Variation is suppressed at the level of the population of cells. 
(ii) There is a division of labor between somatic and reproductive cells.
(iii) There is a bottleneck in reproduction.
(iv) Reproductive cells are sequestered very early in the development of 
the organism, so that they are buffered against the activity that happens 
in the somatic cells during the life-cycle of the organism.
1  Those borrowings of concepts go, actually, in both directions, since it is maybe even 
more common to take concepts used to describe humans groups –for instance, that of society– 
and apply them to describe other animals: such as in animal societies, or in eusocial animals. 
Metaphors are too often used in a loose and a-critical way, sometimes for promoting ideologi-
cal purposes. Furthermore, the borders between metaphorical language and literal language are 
often fuzzy, as shown by the so called dead metaphors. I think the danger involved in the use of 
metaphors and analogies, such as those suggested by the concept of individual, are worth taken, 
given their heuristic potential.
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What characterizes his approach is that such properties and hierarchies 
in general are not «taken for granted as if it were simply a brute fact about the 
biological world» (Okasha 2006, p. 218). For Buss, TIs are achieved through the 
synergy	between	levels	of	selection	and	the	mediation	of	conflicts	that	might	
threaten the integrity of new individuals.
Despite differences mostly in their methodology, Michod (1999) attempts 
also	to	explain	how	the	levels	of	organization	we	find	in	the	natural	world	origi-
nated	in	the	first	place.	He	points	to	the	following	levels:	genes,	chromosomes,	
cells, multicellular organisms, kinship groups, groups and societies. Michod 
highlights the evolution of mechanisms to foster cooperation in the populations 
housed under new organizational levels (taken as levels of selection), as well as 
mechanisms	for	mediating	conflict	between	levels.	He	argues	that	by	means	of	
those	mechanisms,	in	a	TI	(say,	to	multicellular	organisms)	fitness	is	«exported»	
from the lower to the upper level of selection.
Michod acknowledges that he takes cooperation in social species as a model 
to understand all TIs (1999, p. 8), what brings forth analogical reasoning as a way 
to	provide	unified	descriptions	of,	at	the	first	sight,	disparate	phenomena.2
Buss and Michod don’t have much to say about human evolution, though. 
In	a	very	influential	book,	Maynard	Smith	and	Szathmáry	cover	a	broader	terri-
tory and emphasize the role played by language in the transition from «primate 
societies	to	human	societies»	(1997,	p.	6).	This	fits	well	within	their	general	
framework, which presupposes that one of the features in common between 
all TIs is the emergence of new ways for information to be transmitted. They 
highlight also that in TIs «[…] entities that were capable of independent repli-
cation before the transition can replicate only as part of a larger whole after it» 
(Ibid. id.). This relates to the topic of group selection and its role in TIs, I will 
be discussing later.
Godfrey-Smith’s 2009 book is an important contribution to the ongoing 
investigation on TIs and builds on that previous work. He emphasizes that, 
under certain conditions, a Darwinian process can affect the very parameters 
that are implicated in the evolutionary dynamics of a population, bringing about 
new kinds of individuals: «evolutionary processes are themselves evolutionary 
products», he says (2009, p. 15). Embracing explicitly a populational approach, 
Godfrey-Smith represents in a multi-dimensional space the chief features of 
Darwinian populations concerning their evolvability, telling «paradigmatic» 
from «marginal» cases. A TI concludes when a new paradigmatic Darwinian 
2  Analogical reasoning is all about going back and forth between source and target to 
come up with a more abstract description, and it is acknowledgedly a source of models and of 
a new theoretical language (Abrantes 1999, 2004). 
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population (DP) emerges, and transitions are depicted as trajectories in this 
space. 
In my view, Godfrey-Smith did not go as far as he could have in applying 
to the human case this insightful representation, and I will propose its extension 
in order to accomodate the cultural realm, taking on board some of the theses 
on human evolution worked out by Richerson and Boyd in dual inheritance 
theory.
i. culturAl evolution
In a clarifying passage of the chapter on «cultural evolution» of his book 
(2009, 151), Godfrey-Smith argues that, in the cultural realm, we should dis-
tinguish «biological» and cultural «types of thing», I will be naming BP and 
CP. Furthermore, there are «individualistic» and group-level descriptions of 
those Darwinian populations, that can be represented in the following table 
(Abrantes, 2011b):
 
                        
Level
Type of thing
Individualistic Group-level
BP (biological) BPi - agents having 
cultural phenotypes
BPg - groups having 
cultural phenotypes
CP (cultural) CPi - cultural variants CPg - cultural variants’ 
bundles
Table 1 - DPs in the cultural realm
At an «individualistic» level, the populations are either constituted by bio-
logical individuals with cultural phenotypes (BPi) or by the cultural variants themselves (CP i). At the group-level, either groups with different cultural pheno-types (cultural groups, for short) make up the population (BPg), or it is otherwise constituted by bundles of cultural variants (CPg). Given this categorization, the main question that arises is whether these populations are paradigmatic or just 
marginal, as far as their evolvability is concerned.
207Human evolution and transitions in individuality
Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía. Suplemento 18 (2013)
In the forementioned chapter, Godfrey-Smith focuses on the CPi case.3 His chief question is: what are the effects on the Darwinian dynamics of this popu-
lation whenever agents (within a group) follow a particular behavior-updating 
rule? He argues that if they follow a «copy the common rule», CPi will not evolve in a paradigmatic way. Elsewhere I went into the details of his argument 
(Abrantes 2011b), but here I will pursue the program I launched there: to change 
the focal level to BPg instead, that is, to a population of groups having cultural phenotypes. Godfrey-Smith hardly addresses this metapopulation in his book 
and the main reason for that is his belief that human groups fail to meet some 
basic criteria for individuality, I will make explicit in the following sections.
I should emphasize straight away that I am not here concerned with a 
methodological project, namely, that of appraising how fruitful might be the 
application of biological models to explain cultural dynamics. I am pursuing, 
rather, a program in the philosophy of nature: how do humans, and culture 
specifically,	fit	into	our	picture	of	other	well-known	TIs?
From this point of view, I was intrigued by the fact that when Godfrey-
Smith comes to cultural evolution, he draws back from the bold metaphysical 
orientation of his 2009 book and adopts, rather, a methodological stance. 
This move is even more clear in a recent paper, in which he distinguishes 
different «kinds of cultural evolution: Darwinian imitation, cumulative cultu-
ral adaptation and cultural phylogenetic change» (2012, p. 2160). He does not 
mention	his	previous	classification	of	populations	in	the	cultural	domain	and,	
in particular, he does not address the issue of possible TIs in this domain. He 
comes close to it, though, when he discusses the application of «phylogenetic 
methods» to more «[…] cohesive cultures [that] may be less likely to draw on 
outside	 influences,	 and	maintain	 better	 boundaries»	 (Ibid., p. 2168). Those 
cultures are typically associated to cultural groups or societies with a certain 
kind of organization. 
Godfrey-Smith makes clear the requirements for the application of those 
methods	in	this	context,	and	exemplifies	with	a	particular	phenotypic	trait	at	
the group level: «being a complex chiefdom». He goes on arguing that it «[…] 
is not a trait that can increase or decrease in frequency within a society, as it is 
an organizational feature of the whole» (Ibid., p. 2167-8). I think Godfrey-Smith 
would accept, nonetheless, that this trait might increase or decrease in frequency 
in the relevant BPg population he talked about in his 2009 book. The organism metaphor even intrudes in Godfrey-Smith’s language when 
he remarks, correctly from my point of view, that we might have to drop the 
notion of population when dealing with the cultural dynamics that happens 
3  Since the CPi/CPg distinction is not relevant to my aims here, I will lump both under 
the	first	heading.	
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inside each group. To rephrase this claim by using the terminology he devised 
previously, it would not be appropriate to refer to CPi populations in that case: «[…] The human and artefactual elements of the culture might be so tightly 
knitted together that change in the society is more akin to change within a single 
organism than to change in an evolving population» (2012, p. 2167). 
He doesn’t consider, however, the very possibility of an evolution taking 
place in the population of those «single organisms», given variations in their 
fitness	(measured,	for	instance,	by	differential	survival	rates	in	this	BPg popu-lation, I dare say).
This is even more remarkable when Godfrey-Smith comes to the «Discus-
sion»	in	the	final	part,	where	he	refers	to	Whiten	and	Erdal’s	paper	on	hunter-
gatherer groups, published in the very same issue of the journal. Those groups 
are aptly described as «small groups with an egalitarian structure», but instead 
of looking at them as making up a DP, he focuses instead on the psychological 
requirements for cultural phylogenetic change to take place. In next passage, 
Godfrey-Smith keeps addressing behavioral traits of agents (which constitute 
the lower-level populations) that might favor the use of phylogenetic methods 
in those contexts (2012, p. 2169).
Therefore, his focus is not on the evolution of human groups (as possible 
individuals) but on the dynamics of cultural variants. He is looking for «distri-
bution explanations» and not for «origin explanations» (Godfrey-Smith 2009, 
p. 42), even though the relevant distribution of traits amenable to phylogenetic 
methods is among groups and not group-members.4 Furthermore, if one can 
talk of reproduction in this case, it refers to the replication of cultural variants 
and not to the groups themselves.
Still, Whiten and Erdal’s paper admits a metaphysical reading, if their 
terminology is not taken as plainly metaphorical. They mention, effectively, 
«forms of cooperation, egalitarianism, mindreading, language and cultural 
transmission» as elements of a «cognitive and behavioural complex [that] allows 
a human hunter-gatherer band to function as a unique and highly competitive 
predatory organism» (2012, p. 2119).
As a result of this complex, «the band acts as a highly competitive group-
level predator». In another passage, Whiten and Erdal focus on mindreading, 
which they claim «[…] provides a central information processing system 
unattained by other species» (Ibid., p. 2122).
Like these authors, Wilson and Sober argue that «[…] some aspects of 
human mentality can also be understood as a form of group-level cognition 
4  Godfrey-Smith uses, in the 2012 paper, the expression «origin explanation» when he 
discusses «cumulative cultural adaptation», but this is not the sense of origin in the context of 
TIs relevant to the present discussion.
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[…]» (1994, p. 593). In their later book, when they discuss the role multi-level 
selection plays in fashioning «superorganisms», they compare humans with ants 
and bees (2003, pp. 126-30).
In the following sections, I will show how the way Godfrey-Smith frames 
a TI in his 2009 book can help to make clear the conditions in which those 
claims can be read literally.
ii. could eArly humAn culturAl groups hAve been A «type of thing»?
In Godfrey-Smith’s approach, this amounts to ask whether BPg , in the case of hominin groups, might have been a paradigmatic DP. Hence, we have to locate 
this metapopulation in the Darwinian multi-dimensional space. I dealt with the 
V (abundance of variation) parameter previously (Abrantes 2011b), and came 
up with suggestions about how to address other dimensions of this space, as 
far as BPg	is	concerned.	Before	moving	on,	I	would	like	to	recapitulate	briefly	the main points I made there. 
What is at stake is the evolutionary dynamics of a population of groups 
having different cultural phenotypes, especially whenever a conformist 
behavior-updating rule is followed by the members of those groups. Whenever 
their behavior is so biased, they are «de-Darwinized» as far as the abundance 
of variation (in their cultural-behavioral phenotype) is concerned: that is, the 
population of group-members becomes a marginal one regarding this parameter 
of their evolvability. 
Dual inheritance theorists built models in which biases like conformism 
plausibly evolved given certain environmental conditions, and played a role in 
supressing variation inside the group. By the same token, a conformist bias in-
creases variation in the higher-level BPg population of cultural groups and helps to maintain that variation despite possible inter-group migration (this is, actually, 
a requirement for increasing the strength of selection at the group level).
Besides conformism, moral aggression as well as an increasing sensitivity 
to symbolic markers contribute to maintain variation in BPg.5 On top of those mechanisms, emotions such as guilt and shame (included in what Richerson 
and Boyd call «tribal instincts») are taken as elements of a social psychology, 
that evolved for curbing defection and promoting cooperation inside each group 
what,	arguably,	increases	group	fitness	in	certain	conditions.	Using	Michod’s	
apt	depiction,	by	those	means	fitness	switches	from	the	level	of	group-members	
to the group-level.
5  Cf. Richerson and Boyd 2005, p. 69; Boyd and Richerson 2005, p. 85; Bowles and 
Gintis 2011, pp. 52, 113. I guess Godfrey-Smith would accept my rephrasing of the following 
claim: in those cases the group «[…] takes control over the lives and activities of [cultural agents], 
especially with respect to their reproduction» (2009, p. 124).
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However, even if we accept these results concerning the V parameter, they 
are not enough to show that BPg becomes, in that transition, a paradigmatic DP by Godfrey-Smith’s criteria. We have to further evaluate how this metapo-
pulation fares regarding other parameters of the Darwinian multi-dimensional 
space, especially those related to inheritance and reproduction. We should also 
look at the role played by selection at the group level in shaping a (possible) 
new evolutionary dynamics in that population, in the context of an origin ex-
planation.
iii. the evolution of cooperAtion
I mentioned at the beginning that Buss and Michod point to cooperation 
and	to	mechanisms	for	mediating	conflict	between	levels	of	selection	as	the	
underlying basis of TIs. The evolution of cooperation is one of the hot topics in 
present-day investigations about human evolution, and it is beyond the scope of 
the present paper to offer even a rough presentation of the main programs that 
are being developped.6 In the following, I will take for granted one of those: 
Richerson and Boyd’s.
According to dual inheritance theory, the evolution of cooperation in large 
human groups presupposes cultural inheritance, which builds up different niches 
in the metapopulation of groups. Alongside other mechanisms, this generates 
«multiple stable equilibria» and we can say, therefore, that between-group va-
riation has «culturally evolved» (Richerson and Boyd 2005, p. 196).
The evolution of cooperation presupposes, in this account, multi-level 
selection:
 
(i)	 agents	with	 different	 psychological	 profiles	 reproduce	 differentially	
in the particular cultural niche associated with their group (group-members’ 
selection);
(ii) at the metapopulation level, selection works on the existing variation 
between the groups themselves (group selection), as a result of different cultural-
evolutionary trajectories taking place inside those groups, and the prevailing 
environmental conditions.
In this account, to explain how could have evolved a social psychology for 
sustaining cooperation in large non-kin groups, we need to deal simultaneously 
with evolutionary processes going on in different kinds of populations at different 
levels, which are causally related in a complex way.7 
6  For an overview of the main options, see Bowles and Gintis 2011, p. 53.
7  Richerson and Boyd 2005; Hammerstein 2003, p. 462; cf. Bowles and Gintis 2011, 
pp. 50, 112. A gene-culture coevolutionary account is also compatible with Wilson and Sober’s 
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One could rephrase the main elements of the explanation of the evolution of 
human cooperation I sketched above by using Godfrey-Smith’s categorization 
of DPs in the cultural realm, but it would be cumbersome to do so, since the 
evolutionary dynamics of all four kinds of DPs have to be taken into conside-
ration.8 
To be fair, this wouldn’t be a mere redescription of the very same points 
made before, since the framework proposed by Godfrey-Smith points to further 
questions, concerning the evolvavility of those DPs: are they marginal or para-
digmatic? And the other way around: the possible paradigmatic character of the 
BPg	population	depends,	specifically,	on	the	dynamics	of	the	other	populations	
in the cultural realm. 
This leads us back to the issue of origin explanations, and multi-level se-
lection comes to the forefront.
iv. multi-level selection
Multi-level selection (MLS) is, effectively, germane to explaining TIs in 
several accounts, but recent philosophical analysis has shown that people might 
refer to different mechanisms when they invoke this process. MLS comes, ac-
tually,	in	two	flavors	(Okasha,	2006,	56):	
(i) In MLS1, individuals are the focal units. Whenever the members of a 
cultural group, for instance, are the units at stake, different psychological pro-
files	might	imply	differences	in	fitness	depending	on	with	whom	each	agent	
interacts in its neighborhood. The kinds of interaction they engage in vary with 
the structure of the group. Depending on that structure cooperators, for instance, 
might grow in number in the population, as a result of selection, compared to 
free-riders.
(ii) In MLS2, the focal units are the groups themselves. In the case I am 
interested in here, groups with different cultural phenotypes in a particular 
environment –what includes the groups they interact with–, might vary in their 
fitness.
MLS1	and	MLS2	have	often	been	conflated	because	selection	at	the	group	
level is causally effective in both cases, even though not in the same way (Okasha 
2006, p. 59).
two «pathways» to the evolution of human psychological adaptations (1994, p. 600).
8  In some passages, Godfrey-Smith (2009, p. 126) points to this complexity in the context 
of the reproduction of collectives in general, suggesting that an account of their evolutionary 
dynamics has to take into consideration two kinds of multi-level selection (see next section).
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With this distinction in mind, I will turn to how Richerson and Boyd 
conceive group selection and its role in human evolution. Afterwards, I will look 
anew at Godfrey-Smith’s stringent conditions on whether we can legitimately 
talk about reproduction in the case of cultural groups.
According	to	Richerson	and	Boyd,	for	group	selection	to	be	a	significant	
force	in	evolution	three	conditions	have	to	be	fulfilled:	1)	(cultural)	variation	
between groups and mechanisms for maintaining this variation; 2) cultural 
inheritance in	each	group;	3)	intergroup	conflict.
Assuming these requirements, to what kind of MLS are they appealing 
to? This is not a trivial question, given the complexity of the gene-culture 
coevolutionary processes Richerson and Boyd assume in their account of the 
evolution of human cooperation. Nonetheless, I would argue that it cannot be 
of a MLS2 kind, what requires reproduction, inheritance and adaptations at 
the group-level .9
Effectively, in a clarifying passage, Richerson and Boyd make clear that 
for group selection to get a grip on human evolution, «[…] there is no need for 
groups to be sharply bounded, individual-like entities. The only requirement is 
that there are persistent cultural differences between groups, and these diffe-
rences might affect the group’s competitive ability» (2005, p. 207).
It is amazing, however, that Richerson and Boyd (1999) use once the term 
superorganism arguing for the crucial role played by tribal instincts in making 
possible cooperation in complex societies.
They are not inclined to metaphysical speculations, though: Darwinism 
is for them just a «toolkit».10 In any case, Richerson and Boyd do not consider 
that explanations based exclusively on kin selection and reciprocal altruism can 
explain human evolution.11 Still, I would like to ask whether cultural group selec-
tion, as conceived by them, can bolster a TI in the context of human evolution. 
The question is, actually, more general: can MLS1 buttress such a transition? 
Godfrey-Smith presupposes strict criteria concerning reproduction in 
acceptable origin explanations, on top of those presupposed by Richerson and 
Boyd:
9  Bowles and Gintis don’t presuppose MLS2 either in their models (2011, p. 49). 
10  Richerson and Boyd 2005, p.119; Boyd and Richerson 2005, p. 434; cf. Abrantes 
2011a. Therefore, they probably wouldn’t underwrite the philosophical use I am making here of 
their ideas, even though, in some passages, they are willing to compare the evolution of coopera-
tion in complex societies (and the underpinning gene-culture coevolutionary processes) to other 
dramatic transitions that happened in the history of life (Richerson and Boyd 2005., p. 195).
11  Bowles and Gintis make the same point (2011, p. 50).
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Darwinian language is often applied to social groups and communities in such 
a way that the focus is on persistence of a group as contrasted with extinction, 
or growth as opposed to shrinkage [...]. In this book I treat Darwinian processes 
involving growth and persistence without reproduction as marginal cases [...]. So 
«cultural	group	selection»	of	a	significant	kind	requires	differential	reproduction,	
not just differential persistence, even though the border between these is vague 
(Ibid., 151-2; cf. 118-9).
Richerson	and	Boyd	could	be	a	target	here,	since	their	theory	exemplifies	
the roles played by growth –measured by how many offspring group-members 
a particular group produces –and by group persistence (versus extinction) in a 
context	of	inter-group	conflict.	
Godfrey-Smith asserts, in a nutshell, that «Group selection requires a 
Darwinian population of groups; groups must vary, reproduce, and inherit 
features from other groups» (2009, p. 118-9).12 As I have pointed out, these are 
the conditions for MLS2. I mentioned before that Godfrey-Smith is skeptical 
about the possibility that cultural groups might reproduce; in this case, BPg would not be a paradigmatic DP.
If	we	are	not	able	to	come	up	with	modalities	of	fitness	and	reproduction	
adequate to BPg (a conceptual problem), it is worthless to look at MLS2 as a mechanism playing a role in the evolution of that metapopulation. In this case, 
the preconditions for a TI in human evolution are not met. Theses such as those 
voiced by Wilson, Sober, Whiten and Erdal, quoted above, as well as the uses 
of the notion of individual and superorganism applied to human groups, will 
have to be taken as metaphorical, at most.
Godfrey-Smith acknowledges, however, that the borders between differen-
tial reproduction and differential persistence are fuzzy. Given the «permissive 
attitude» (2009, p. 91) he embraces in other hard cases, we are authorized to 
come up with modalities of reproduction appropriate to cultural groups, that 
might underwrite a conceivable TI in the human lineage, fueled by cultural 
inheritance (cf. ibid. pp. 84-6; Dennett 2011).
In the case of cultural groups, the literature mentions, effectively, besides 
growth and persistence, other modalities of group reproduction that might 
circumvent Godfrey-Smith’s appraisal of the Darwinian status of a BPg popu-lation13,	such	as	group	fission	and	colonization.
12  In my understanding, Godfrey-Smith requires here group inheritance and not just 
group-member inheritance, as in Richerson and Boyd’s requirements for group-selection. Due 
to lack of space, I cannot discuss in this paper inheritance at different levels (cf. Okasha on 
heritability, 2006, pp. 59,185).
13  Grove et al. 2012; Sterelny 2012, pp. 179-80; Bowles and Gintis 2011, p. 
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What is at stake, however, is not just whether BPg	might	fulfill	the	conditions	for being a paradigmatic DP, but to provide a plausible origin explanation of 
the emergence of that population.
v. A diAchronic ApproAch
If we take a diachronic approach (Okasha 2006, pp. 219-20), MLS1 and 
MLS2 can both play roles in different stages of a TI.14 MLS2 is usually con-
sidered	a	necessary	mechanism	in	the	final	stages	of	the	process,	in	which	a	
new kind of individual emerges –in our hypothetical case, a paradigmatic DP 
of human groups. But one cannot invoke MLS2 from the beginning since an 
individual,	with	its	hierarchical	organization,	has	first	to	be	set	up	through	me-
chanisms acting at the lower levels (Okasha, ibid., p. 229). Afterwards, MLS2 
can get a grip on, playing a crucial role in maintaining the integrity of the new 
individual	–e.g.	by	keeping	in	place	mechanisms	for	conflict	mediation	and	for	
avoiding the risks of disruption by free-riders, that are always a threat.
MLS1 is often mentioned as an important mechanism in the initial stages 
of TIs, starting over the whole process. In the case I am examining here, kin 
selection and reciprocal altruism play acknowledgedly important roles in the 
evolution of cooperation, and can actually be seen as MLS1 mechanisms (Wil-
son and Sober, 2003; Okasha, 2006, pp. 180-5). After the family group is in 
place as a unit of selection, as well as agents with the psychological capacities 
for	engaging	in	reciprocity,	the	first	stage	in	a	transition	towards	a	higher-level	
individual concludes.
Along these lines, the following stages in a transition towards a paradigmatic 
population of cultural groups are conceivable:
1) Family groups and small non-kin groups.
2) Large cooperative groups. The stability of these larger non-kin groups 
might presuppose the evolution of a social psychology, as posited by dual in-
heritance theorists; a new modality of inheritance has also to be in place for 
culture to accumulate and to generate variation in the BPg population.3) Groups as full-blown individuals. In this stage, mechanisms for suppres-
sing	internal	variation	and	for	conflict	mediation	have	to	be	in	place	and	a	new	
modality of group-level reproduction emerges.
In	 the	first	 two	 stages,	MLS1	mechanisms	drive	 the	 transition,	 and	 in	
the last stage a MLS2 mechanism stabilizes it. Evolutionary transitions are 
50-1; cf. Okasha 2006, pp. 179, 188.
14  This does not exclude that MLS1 and MLS2 might be acting simultaneously from a 
certain point of a TI, besides other mechanisms. 
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typically gradual and we should not expect sharp boundaries separating these 
stages15 and all those mechanisms might play simultaneously causal roles in 
some stages.16
In a similar vein, Simpson (2011) distinguishes three «phases» in evolu-
tionary transitions: the «aggregate phase», the «group phase» and the «indivi-
dual	phase».	To	each	of	those	corresponds	a	«dominant	fitness	component»:	
differential expansion, differential viability («persistence»), and differential 
reproduction proper («fecundity»). 
Simpson claims that cultural groups don’t have fecundity, the same point 
made by Godfrey-Smith (cf. Okasha 2006, 58). A transition to the individual pha-
se would also be characterized by a «division of labor» among group-members, 
especially concerning growth and reproduction. Multicellular organisms, as 
described by Buss particularly, is clearly taken here as a model. Simpson argues 
that as far as human cultural groups lack this kind of «partitioning», they «don’t 
have the status of full individuals» (2011, p. 222).
There is no place here to speculate on the existence of analogs of this kind 
of partitioning in cultural groups. Dual inheritance theory offers, however, use-
ful insights on the existence of differences among group-members concerning 
their role in the replication of cultural variants (that is, in the dynamics of a 
CPi population): some individuals are, for instance, taken as models by other 
individuals that are biased to imitate them preferentially.17
vi. conclusions
I attempted to show that the transitions in individuality literature, especially 
Godfrey-Smith’s contributions to it, provides a fertile framework to understand 
claims,	we	keep	finding	in	recent	publications,	to	the	effect	that	hominin	groups	
might have functioned as individuals (that is, as paradigmatic Darwinian po-
pulations) in our evolutionary past.
Even though I dealt mainly with conceptual problems –were philosophers 
can expect to make a contribution–, the range of empirical problems related to 
the topics discussed in this paper is huge. 
One conceptual problem I dealt with is the requirements for group-selection 
to play a role in a possible transition in individuality in hominin evolution, as-
sociated with culture as a new inheritance system. In this context, I have shown 
that	group	reproduction	is	a	requirement	hard	to	be	fulfilled.	Data	about	the	
15  Cf. McBrearty and A. Brooks 2000.
16  See Okasha 2006, p.177-8; Sober and Wilson 2003, esp. chapters 4 and 5; Bowles 
and Gintis 2011, p. 114.
17  Cf. Abrantes 2011b, footnote 12. Refer also to the idea of «reproductive 
leveling» in Bowles and Gintis, 2011, p.112.
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size of hominin groups, the environmental conditions in which they lived and 
how these conditions varied, the kinds of interaction they engaged with other 
groups, migration patterns, etc. are directly relevant to tackle this issue, but they 
are very hard to be obtained.18
The	 archeological	 records	 are	 poor,	 difficult	 to	 interpret	 or	 inexistent.	
Empirical evidence that can be obtained from extant hunter-gatherer groups, 
are disputable (see Richerson and Boyd, forthcoming). Empirical data clearly 
underdetermines, furthermore, the various theories on the evolution of human 
cooperation that are being presently debated, and probably we will have to live 
for a long time with controversies about many of the issues involved. 
Mathematical modeling and simulations are often employed (especially 
among dual inheritance theorists) to settle some questions, but this methodology 
has its limitations given the degree of idealization involved (Abrantes 2011a).
The unavoidable speculative character of this endeavour is not necessarily an 
obstacle but can be part of the answer, in the sense that a theoretical framework 
can direct our attention to the relevant data and suggest ways of obtaining and 
interpreting them.
The timing of a possible transition towards a metapopulation of cultural 
groups	in	hominin	evolution	exemplifies	this	interplay	of	conceptual	and	em-
pirical problems.19
I highlighted that a dual inheritance account of the evolution of cooperation 
–which I adopted as a background in the previous discussions–, presupposes, 
somewhat paradoxically, that most, if not all, hominin evolution has happened 
in	a	scenario	of	conflict	between	cultural	groups	(Bowles	and	Gintis	2011,	p.	
113).20 
Sterelny’s main objection to that «Bowles’s and Gintis’s picture» concerns 
the purported role of group selection in the evolution of human cooperation, 
what	he	denies	for	empirical	reasons:	he	claims	that	conflict	between	hunter-
gatherer bands wasn’t as common in the Pleistocene as that picture presupposes 
(Sterelny 2012, pp. 178-80). He still believes, nonetheless, that «group selection 
has likely played an important role in hominin evolution» (Sterelny 2012, p. 
178), even if he is «now less sure that this is so» (Sterelny 2012, xii) –probably 
having in mind the bolder position he defended earlier (Sterelny 2003).
18  Grove et al. (2012) combine in an interesting way mathematical modeling and data 
from	various	extant	primates	to	predict	the	fission/	fusion	patterns	of	reproduction	of	hunter-
gatherer groups coping with increasing population and unstable environmental conditions. See 
also McBrearty and A. Brooks 2000, esp. pp. 532-3.
19  This should not be a surprise for whoever adopts a naturalistic stance in philosophical 
investigation. 
20  Cf. «parochial altruism» (Bowles and Gintis 2011, p. 113).
217Human evolution and transitions in individuality
Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía. Suplemento 18 (2013)
He claims, using Godfrey-Smith’s explicit populational approach, that ho-
minin groups might have constituted a DP after all, pointing to the requirements 
for group selection to get a grip on its evolutionary dynamics:
«[…] Selection on bands is potentially powerful if bands differ from one 
another	in	ways	that	are	relevant	to	the	fitness	of	those	bands,	and	if	those	di-
fferences	are	transmitted	to	groups	that	form	as	bands	fissure.	Group	selection	
is made more powerful by any process that leads to groups being internally 
homogeneous, and different from other groups […]. So perhaps the expansion 
of various forms of cooperation within local groups led to the formation of a 
metapopulation of local hominin groups subject to natural selection» (Sterelny 
2012, p. 177).
Sterelny argues that cooperation evolved earlier (maybe even before Homo 
erectus was in the play), by selection acting at the individual-level, «in an envi-
ronment of relatively peaceful intercommunity relations» and in a scenario of 
coevolution between «language, normative thought, conventions, and institutions 
[…]» (Ibid., p. 180).
The traits that were selected at the group-level presupposed cooperation 
but were relevant, actually, for «risk management», given the pressures of a very 
unstable physical environment that checked population growth during most of 
the Pleistocene. Fitness differences between groups didn’t comprise, in this 
scenario,	traits	relevant	for	engaging	in	conflict	with	other	groups	but,	instead,	
for cooperation (Sterelny 2012, pp. 189-190).21 
If the points I made before about the role played by group selection in TIs 
are on the right track, then the evolution of cooperation in the hominin lineage 
would not be associated with a transition to individual-like cultural groups. In 
Sterelny’s scenario, group-selection might have played a role in the Holocene, 
though,	when	conflict	and	war	became	common.22 
But Holocene societies were internally much more heterogeneous than 
Pleistocene hunter-gatherer egalitarian groups.23 The models from previous 
21  To be fair, Bowles and Gintis acknowledge that cooperation between hominin groups 
might also have happened in many situations (2011, p. 114; see also Richerson and Boyd, 
forthcoming).	The	issue	is	rather	the	indispensable	role	played	by	conflict	in	their	account	of	
the evolution of human cooperation.
22  Sterelny’s problem is, rather, how to explain the maintenance of the «prosocial dis-
positions»	required	for	cooperation,	when	war	and	conflict	became	common	in	the	Holocene,	
since these new conditions would favor defection (by free-riders), creating the conditions for a 
«cooperation crisis» (Ibid., pp. 196-7).
23  Cf. Richerson and Boyd’s «work-around mechanisms» in complex societies (Richerson 
and	Boyd,	2005,	p.	231).	In	the	first	versions	of	this	paper,	I	was	willing	to	see	such	internal	
divisions of a group, compatible with tribal instincts, as a modality of reproduction, besides those 
I mentioned in the former sections.
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TIs (such as the transition to multicellular organisms) fail in this context, and 
the application of Godfrey-Smith’s multi-dimensional representation, as well 
as his distinction between marginal and paradigmatic populations, become too 
much strained.
The role played by group-selection in human evolution keeps being con-
troversial and, consequently, the very possibility of a TI, as well as its timing, 
in this evolution.24 
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